Introduction
In the United States, there exist enormous geographic welfare (especially AFDC) differentials. Such differentials have been examined by numerous scholars in recent years (for example, Albin and Stein, 1971; Cebula, 1976; Orr, 1976; and Tresch 1975) . Along these lines, in a recent issue of Public Choice, Spall (1978) addresses the determinants of AFDC levels in states. The purpose of this Note is not to criticize the study by Spall (1978) ; rather, the purpose of this Note is simply to offer an alternative analysis of the determinants of geographic AFDC differentials. In particular, the model tested below hypothesizes a basically political determination of AFDC levels, a political determination principally involving an alignment of two socio-economic groups: (1) the very poor (actual AFDC recipients) and (2) those who are probably (although not current actual) AFDC recipients.
The model
This paper argues that AFDC levels are significantly influenced by a political alignment involving persons who are currently receiving AFDC benefits and persons who believe that they are likely to become AFDC recipients.
It is argued that eligible voters who are actual AFDC recipients have strong incentives to support AFDC increases. For one thing, actual AFDC recipients gain directly and significantly from such increases because AFDC benefits are a very sizeable proportion of the total income of such persons. In addition, as a pragmatic matter, AFDC recipients on the average do not bear any consequential direct additional tax burden as a result of AFDC increases; in point of fact, the taxes used to finance AFDC increases are pricipally borne by nonwelfare recipients (see Aronson and Schwartz, 1973; and Von Furstenberg and Muelter, 1971) . Thus, AFDC recipients are likely to vote in favor of AFDC increases because they reap substantial net benefits from such policies. It follows that AFDC increses are likely to be an increasing function of the actual number of AFDC recipients.
On a somewhat different level, there may exist persons in society who, while not currently receiving AFDC benefits, may believe that they are likely to become welfare eligible at some future time. It is argued here that persons who believe that they are likely to become AFDC recipients may wish to support policies to raise AFDC levels since they view themselves as potential direct benefactors of such increases. Whether a person envisions himself as a potential AFDC recipient is ofcource likely to depend upon a variety of forces, some economic and some not. This paper argues that the unemployment rate among non-welfare recipients is likely to be a critical factor here. In particular, it is argued that the higher the unemployment rate among non-welfare recipients, the greater the degree to which non-welfare recipients are likely to view themselves as potential welfare recipients (and hence as potential benefactors of welfare hikes). Therefore, the higher the unemployment rate among non-welfare recipients, the greater the degree to which non-welfare recipients are likely to align themselves at the polls with actual AFDC recipients in support of welfare hikes. It follows, then, that the higher this unemployment rate, the greater the likelihood of passage of AFDC increases. 
Empirical analysis

